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
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Executive Secretary

8 Apr '87

Date

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ASSOCIATION OF FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

Reply To:

April 2, 1987

Mr. Robert Gates
Acting Director Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Bob:

I can't tell you how much we all appreciate you taking time out from your busy schedule to come up to New York to spend time with our group. The follow-up response from our members, not to mention, the OSS and MI people that also attended, were all positive.


By your presence as an outstanding speaker, and the knowledge that went with it, you did much for our organization, for which we are all thankful. Had time permitted, our meeting would have gone on for a long time, as there were many questions still to be asked.

I hope you found the dinner relaxing. We tried to get together an interesting group, and one which you would feel comfortable with. Each guest has expressed their most favorable impression, especially George Lodge.

I must add that everything went along smoothly, at least from our prospective, thanks to the guiding help of Mary Evelyn Dean. She was just delightful to work with.

Once again, thank you on behalf of myself and the New York Chapter of AFIO. We wish you an enjoyable and less hectic Summer.

Best wishes and thanks,


Donald L. Milton
President
New York Chapter

DLM:cc
Reply to:



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

87-1229

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

24 March 1987

Note for

STAT

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I am returning the book
for Mr. Gates' New York trip.
I have enclosed a copy of the
speech he gave FYI.

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War By Another Name

An Address to the Association of Former Intelligence Officers
(New York)
by Robert M. Gates
Acting Director of Central Intelligence
23 March 1987

The most divisive and controversial part of American foreign policy for nearly four decades has been our effort in the Third World to preserve and defend pro-Western governments, to resist Communist aggression and subversion, and to promote economic development and democracy.

Our continuing difficulty in formulating a coherent and sustainable bipartisan strategy for the Third World over two generations contrasts sharply with the Soviet Union's relentless effort there to eliminate Western influence, establish strategically located client Communist states, and to gain access to strategic resources.

But while we may debate strategy and how to respond, the facts of Soviet involvement in major Third World conflicts are undeniable. Consider two very painful memories:

- It is clear that the Soviet Union, and Stalin personally, played a central role in North Korea's invasion of the South in 1950, the cause of our



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first great post-war strategic debate over strategy in the Third World.

- Although the strategic consequences of a victory by North Vietnam were hotly debated in the US, we now see the Soviet Navy well entrenched in the great naval base at Cam Ranh Bay, and Vietnam's economic and military dependence on the Soviet Union; we recall the Soviet military supplyline that made Hanoi's victory possible, and remember Soviet help in the conquest of Laos and Cambodia. The resulting human suffering in Southeast Asia was even more horrifying than predicted.

Somehow many Americans thought their first loss of a major foreign war -- Vietnam -- would have no important consequences, especially inasmuch as it was accompanied by so-called "detente" with the Soviet Union and the opening to China. Yet, it was in fact a major watershed in post World War II history, especially as it coincided with the collapse of Portugal's colonial empire in Africa; revolutions in Iran, Ethiopia and Nicaragua; and Congressional actions in the mid-1970s cutting off all US assistance to the non-Communist forces in Angola, thus signaling the withdrawal of American support for opponents of Marxist-Leninist forces in the Third World.

The effects of American defeat in Vietnam, the revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua, and the coming to power of bitterly

antagonistic and aggressively destabilizing governments in all three countries undermined the confidence of US friends and allies in the Third World (not to mention in Europe and Japan) and ensured that an opportunistic Soviet Union would see in the Third World its principal foreign policy opportunities for years to come.

And they moved aggressively to create or exploit such opportunities. Throughout the Third World, the Soviet Union and its clients for the past ten years have incited violence and disorder and sponsored subversion of neutral or pro-Western governments in El Salvador, Honduras, Colombia, various Caribbean States, Chad, Sudan, Suriname, North Yemen, Oman, Pakistan, New Caledonia, South Korea, Grenada, and many others. The Soviet Union has affixed itself as a parasite to legitimate nationalist, anticolonial movements or to those who have overthrown repressive or incompetent regimes and tried wherever possible to convert or consolidate them into Marxist-Leninist dictatorships as in Nicaragua, Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan. And now these same regimes in the process of consolidating power are fighting their own people. Open warfare by invading Communist armies is being waged in Cambodia and Afghanistan. And in most instances of state support for terrorism, the government involved is tied in some way to the USSR.

These contemporary challenges to international order and stability -- and to democratic values -- certainly grow primarily out of localized and specific circumstances. To be sure, there are local economic, social, racial, human rights and other injustices. And many -- too many -- governments have demonstrated their capacity to inflict hardship and violence on their own people. But, that said, we cannot close our eyes to a common theme across the entire Third World and that is the pervasively destructive role of the Soviet Union and its clients.

In 1919, Trotsky said that, "The road to London and Paris lies through Calcutta." This conviction that the West could more easily and effectively be weakened and made vulnerable through the Third World than by direct confrontation remains central to Soviet foreign policy. And if you question how critical this is for Moscow, remember that the Soviets allowed detente with the US, which was highly advantageous to them, to founder substantially with successive Presidents in the 1970s because the USSR refused to moderate its aggressive pursuit of Third World opportunities -- in Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua and Afghanistan.

Subversion, Violence and Repression

In the mid-1970s, new Soviet tactics in the Third World, combined with historic events and opportunities, emerged to challenge Western presence, progress toward democracy and sound economic development in the Third World. The new tactics were designed to minimize the chance of a repetition of disastrous setbacks such as their expulsion from Egypt in 1972 and the ouster of a Marxist regime in Chile in 1973. The strategy had five parts:

- First, the cornerstone of the new Soviet approach was the use of Cuban forces to establish and sustain the power of "revolutionary governments". They first helped consolidate radical power in Angola. This was followed by the dispatch of thousands of Cuban troops to Ethiopia where that regime also became dependent on their support.

This tactic of using Third World Communist or radical states as surrogates in the Third World subsequently involved assisting Vietnam's conquest of the remainder of Indochina, Libya's designs in Chad and plotting against Sudan, South Yemen's aggression against Oman and North Yemen, and Cuba's support for regimes in Nicaragua, Grenada and Suriname as well as the insurgency in El Salvador.

- Second, when radical governments came to power without the aid of foreign troops, as in Nicaragua, Soviets directly or through their surrogates such as East Germany helped in the establishment of an internal security structure to ensure that any possible challenge from within would be stamped out.
- Third, the Soviets continued to supplement these tactics with more traditional offerings such as technical and political training in the USSR, the rapid supply of weapons, and the use of a wide range of covert actions to support friends and to help defeat or destabilize unfriendly challengers or governments.
- Fourth, the USSR proved in Afghanistan that it would still be willing to launch its own forces at targets on its periphery -- and perhaps elsewhere -- when and if circumstances are right.
- Fifth, and finally, the Soviets advised new radical regimes to mute their revolutionary rhetoric and to try to keep their links to Western commercial resources, foreign assistance and international financial institutions. Soviet ambitions did not cloud their recognition that they could not afford more economic dependents such as Cuba and Vietnam.

Soviet support for the radical regimes that it has helped establish has been sustained. The Soviets and their East European allies have provided military and economic assistance to Nicaragua over the past five years approaching 3.0 billion dollars -- almost a billion in 1986 alone. Compare this with the highly controversial \$100 million American program to assist the resistance in that country. The Soviets have provided a full range of military weapons and support and also have become Nicaragua's major source of economic aid. They are attempting to shore up a Nicaraguan economy rapidly deteriorating because of slumping industrial and agricultural production, falling export earnings and cutbacks in Western funding. The Soviet Union has replaced Mexico as Nicaragua's primary supplier of oil.

In Angola, total Communist military and economic assistance now stands at almost \$3.5 billion, most of it since 1984. Almost all of that assistance is military. The Soviets are not particularly generous, however, and because Angola in the past has had the ability to pay, the Soviets and Cubans have required payment for material and technicians in hard currency, thus adding to the country's economic problems.

It is in Afghanistan, however, that the full measure of Soviet ambitions in the Third World can be taken most clearly. More than 100,000 Soviet troops are in Afghanistan, with more than a million troops having served. The cost to Afghanistan

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Conclusions: What is to be Done

As we reflect on the last forty years of war, subversion, instability and terrorism in the Third World, it is clear that the Soviet Union and its surrogates have played and are continuing to play a major role. Their involvement is a common feature as is their ability relentlessly to sustain their participation over many years. It is imperative that, at long last, Americans recognize the strategic significance of this Soviet offensive -- that it is in reality, a war, a war waged between nations and against Western influence and presence, against economic development and against the growth of democratic values. It is war without declaration, without mobilization, without massive armies. It is, in fact, that long twilight war described nearly a quarter century ago by President Kennedy.

This challenge posed by the Soviet Union has been understood by some since the beginning of the Cold War. Dean Acheson said in 1946 in this regard, "Our name for [such] problems is significant. We call them headaches. You take a powder and they are gone. The pains about which we are talking are not like that. They will stay with us until death. We have got to understand that all our lives the danger, the uncertainty, the need for alertness, for effort, for discipline will be upon us. This is new to us. It will be hard for us."

What then are we to do? From Harry Truman to Ronald Reagan, our Presidents have recognized the importance of this struggle in the Third World -- some sooner than others. But public and Congressional understanding and support have waxed and waned. What we need is a vigorous strategy we can sustain in a struggle Secretary Shultz has said is "the prime challenge we will face, at least through the remainder of this century." I would like to suggest several steps, none of them new, and many of them in train now, that should be integrated into a strategy to meet the long term Soviet challenge and promote democracy and freedom in the Third World.

1. First, Congress and the Executive Branch, Republicans and Democrats, must collaborate more closely in the setting of strategy. There seems to be more agreement on the nature of the threat than on what to do about it. Cooperation and support in recent years has been good in some areas; not so good in others. There have been close calls and too often prolonged delays in getting help to our friends. Too often in the past, opportunities to counter the Soviets have been lost by clashes between the two Branches, or by partisan politics. If common understanding of the Soviet challenge in the Third World cannot be translated into a program of action that can be counted on for more than a year at a time, if that, we will have little success. At the same time, those who would lay claim to a constructive role in protecting our interests and advancing stability and freedom in the Third World cannot oppose overt military action and covert action and at the same time also reject security assistance and economic assistance for key countries. The United States must have some means to help our friends in the Third World defend themselves and grow economically, and support for those means must be bipartisan and stable.

2. Second, more must be done to educate the public, the Congress, and Third World governments about Soviet strategy in

the Third World. A continuing information program to inform and tie together developments in areas widely distant is needed and must be pursued over a long term.

3. We must, as a country, give priority to learning more about developments in the Third World and to providing early warning of economic, social, and political problems that foreshadow instability and opportunities for exploitation by the USSR or its clients. We should serve as a clearing house of information useful to threatened countries, for example, seeing to it that lessons learned in successful counterinsurgencies or economic development programs are shared.

4. The US must establish priorities in terms of major commitments. If our early help fails to prevent serious trouble, for which countries are we prepared to put our chips on the table? Also, I believe we should at least try to make such choices in consultation with key members of Congress so that their support at crucial moments is more likely. Great losing battles in Congress for foreign military sales or economic assistance for important Third World friends, played out on the world stage and at critical times, represent devastating setbacks for the US with ramifications going far beyond the affected country.

5. We must be -- and are -- prepared to demand firmly, but tactfully and privately, that our friends observe certain

standards of behavior with regard to basic human rights. It is required by our own principles and essential to political support in the US. Moreover, we have to be -- and are -- willing to talk straight to those we would help about issues they must address to block Soviet and other foreign exploitation of their problems -- issues such as land reform and corruption. We have a right and a responsibility to condition our support -- but must do so in ways that make it possible politically for the recipient to comply.

6. We need to change our approach to foreign military sales so that the US can provide arms more quickly to our friends in need -- provide them the tools to do the job -- and to do so without hanging out all their dirty linen for the world to see. It does not serve any rational purpose to humiliate those whom we would help.

7. Covert action can be used, as in the past, to create problems for hostile governments, and to provide discreet help to friendly organizations and governments. Indeed, at times it may be the only means we have to help them.

8. We must be prepared to use overt military forces where circumstances are appropriate, as in Grenada and Libya.

9. We must find a way to mobilize and use our greatest asset in the Third World -- private business. No one in the

Third World wants to adopt the Soviet economic system. Neither we nor the Soviets can offer unlimited or even large-scale economic assistance to the Third World. Investment is the key to economic success or at least survival in the Third World and we, our NATO allies and Japan need to develop a common strategy to promote investment in the Third World. The Soviets are helpless to compete with private capital in these countries.

10. Finally, we need to have a strategy supported with consistency through more than one Presidency. This Administration and Congress in recent years have gone further than any of their predecessors in developing and sustaining a coherent strategy. But more must be done, and it must endure. After all, we now face a Soviet leader who could be in power well into the 21st century.

We are engaged in a historic struggle with the Soviet Union, a struggle between age-old tyranny -- to use an old fashioned word -- and the concept that the highest goal of the State is to protect and foster the creative capabilities and liberties of the individual. The battle lines are most sharply drawn in the Third World. We have enormous assets and advantages in this struggle. We offer an economic model based on private enterprise for long term development, independence, stability, and prosperity. We offer a model of freedom and democratic ideals; we offer religious tolerance and spiritual values; and we have democratic allies willing to help. As the

President has said, we welcome the democratic revolution in the Third World and are committed to promoting national independence and popular rule. In contrast, the Soviet Union offers only a model police state, a new form of colonial subservience, the morality of the gun, and the austerity of totalitarian socialism.

Our experience over the last forty years makes clear that Soviet aggression and subversion in the Third World cannot be stopped by negotiation alone (if at all); it must be resisted -- politically, economically and militarily.

As a country, we must develop realistic policies, public support for those policies and make the long term investment essential to a constructive role in helping to bring peace, stability, prosperity and freedom to the Third World. The East-West struggle to influence the future of the Third World is a classic confrontation of the Soviet capacity to destroy arrayed against the democratic nations' capacity to build. Americans cannot and must not be indifferent to the outcome.

ER

20 March 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: George V. Lauder
Director, Public Affairs Office

SUBJECT: Trip to New York

1. Action Requested: None. This is background information for your trip to New York on Monday, 23 March, to meet with THE NEW YORK TIMES editorial board, attend a luncheon given in your honor by Eli Jacobs, and address an AFIO reception followed by a private dinner. A business suit is the appropriate dress for your appearances.

2. Meet with THE NEW YORK TIMES Editorial Board: You will meet with deputy editorial page editor Leslie (Les) H. Gelb, assistant publisher Arthur O. Sulzberger Jr., and other members of the editorial board from 11:30 a.m. - 12:20 p.m. at THE NEW YORK TIMES offices at 229 West 43rd Street between 7th and 8th. We are to check in with the guard at the main desk and proceed to the 10th floor where we will be met by Les Gelb's secretary Kathleen Quinn who will escort us to the conference room. Ms. Quinn will give you the finalized list of attendees, and I will remain with you throughout the meeting. Other NEW YORK TIMES editorial writers as of this date who will be attending are:

James Greenfield	Assistant Managing Editor
William Borders	Editor, Week in Review, Sunday section
Jack MacKinzie	Editorial writer
Geneva Overholser	Editorial writer

3. Arrangements for VIP Luncheon: You are requested to be at the Century Association "The Century Club," 7 West 43rd Street at 12:30 p.m. for an off-the-record luncheon hosted in a private room by banker/entrepreneur Eli Jacobs. (See luncheon background tab for articles on Mr. Jacobs.) Guests at the luncheon will be:

Walter Riston	Head, Citicorp Bank
John Chancellor	NBC
Walter Levy	Leading US Petroleum Economist
Edwin Guthman	Editor, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER; former editor, LOS ANGELES TIMES
Dan Rather	CBS

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SUBJECT: Trip to New York

William C. Hyland	Editor, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
John Brademas	President, New York University; former Congressman
Joshua Lederberg	President, Rockefeller University; Nobel prize winner, geneticist

Adjournment is at approximately 2:00 p.m.

4. Arrangements for New York AFIO Chapter Meeting and Private Dinner:

You are requested to be at the main entrance of the University Club at 1 West 54th Street, corner of 5th Avenue, at 5:45 p.m. where you will be met by the President of the New York AFIO Chapter Donald (Don) Milton. (See AFIO background tab for biography.) You will be escorted to the College Hall for a reception and your remarks are scheduled to begin at approximately 6:15 p.m. Mr. Milton will introduce you. The proposed format is 30 minutes of remarks on a topic of your choice followed by 30 minutes of Questions and Answers. Adjournment is scheduled for 7:15 p.m. A podium and microphone will be available and your remarks will be taped by AFIO for our records. An in-house photographer will take photographs prior to your speech.

The audience of approximately 200 includes AFIO members and their guests, Veterans of the OSS, and the FBI field office representatives. Neither the media nor foreign nationals will attend. I will be present along with

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The AFIO New York City Chapter was founded in the late 1970s by the late Mr. Derek Lee. Approximately 150 former intelligence professionals meet three times a year to hear prominent speakers. William Casey spoke to this group in November 1984 and Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization Lieutenant General James A. Abrahamson, USAF, gave an address in January. Other speakers have been William Colby, Vladimir Sakharov, and Arnaud de Borchgrave.

Following your presentation, you are requested to be at the Marco Polo Club in the Waldorf Astoria at Park Avenue and 50th for a private dinner hosted by Don Milton. The dinner is a social occasion and remarks are not requested. All guests, with the exception of David Steinberg, will have heard your address. The following will attend:

George Cabot Lodge	Professor, Business Administration, Harvard Business School
David Steinberg	President, Long Island University
Edwin Bitter	Chairman and CEO, Scalandre, Inc.
William Hood	Author of <u>Mole</u> and <u>Spy Wednesday</u>

SUBJECT: Trip to New York

Claire Boothe Luce	Member, PFIAB	
John O. Koehler	President, Koehler International	
Roy Steinford	Consultant, White House Director of Communications	25X1

Patricia Steinford		
William (Bill) Smith	Member, AFIO Board of Directors, New York	25X1
Joseph Crivelli	Member, AFIO Board of Directors, New York	

I will be present, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (See AFIO background materials for table seating chart and biographies.) Adjournment is at 9:30 p.m.

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[REDACTED]
George V. Lauder

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Executive Registry

87-0673X

13 February 1987

ADCI:

President of AFIO New York Don Milton has invited you to attend a private dinner following your address to members of the New York AFIO Chapter on Monday, 23 March, at the University Club in New York City. The reception begins at 5:30 p.m. and your speech at 6:00 p.m. followed by Questions and Answers. Adjournment will be at approximately 7:15 p.m. The proposed off-the-record dinner (7:30 - 9:30 p.m.) would be at the Marco Polo Club in the Waldorf Astoria. (See attached for the suggested guest list.) Schedule permitting, you may wish to add this to your agenda. Please indicate your preference below and Public Affairs will make the appropriate response.

STAT

George V. Lauder

ACCEPT DINNER INVITATION:

/s/ RG

Acting Director of Central Intelligence

DATE: **24 FEB 1987**

STAT

DECLINE DINNER INVITATION:

STAT

Acting Director of Central Intelligence

DATE: _____

STAT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Executive Registry

87-0570x

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Phone: (703) 351-2053

12 February 1987

Mr. Donald L. Milton
President
Association of Former Intelligence Officers

STAT

Dear Mr. Milton:

This is to confirm arrangements for Acting CIA Director Robert M. Gates' address at the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) New York on Monday, 23 March, 5:30 p.m. at the University Club in New York City.

The proposed format for the reception and meeting is approximately 30 minutes of remarks which are to begin at 6:00 p.m. followed by 30 minutes of Questions and Answers. Adjournment is scheduled between 7:00 - 7:15 p.m. According to our telephone conversation, only members and their guests whose names appear on the guest list will be admitted, and neither the media nor foreign nation will be present. When former Director Casey spoke to your group in November 1984, Ms. Patricia Milton was the official AFIO photographer for the event. Please let us know your plans on this. As soon as it is convenient, I would appreciate knowing who will introduce Mr. Gates. Please have a microphone and podium available. We also request that AFIO tape his speech for our historical records. Short biographies of those individuals with whom he will be in contact would be appreciated.

I will be in touch with you when we know the Acting Director's wishes concerning the proposed off-the-record dinner following his presentation. Enclosed for your information is a biography and photograph of Mr. Gates. Thank you for your kind attention to these details and for the information that you have provided. If you have any further questions on the arrangements for the event or if there is anything I can do to help you, please feel free to call me on [redacted]

STAT

Sincerely,

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Enclosures



STAT



ASSOCIATION OF FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

Reply To:

October 29, 1986

Mr. George V. Lauder
Director Public Affairs
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

STAT

Dear George:

In pursuant of our conversation, I am writing to you in arrange a date for Bob Gates to address our group in New York City sometime in the near future.

We are very flexible as to our meeting schedule. We usually meet on a week-day evening at approximately 5:30 P.M. depending on our speakers schedule. We try to schedule three meetings a year and have enjoyed such speakers as Bill Colby, Vladimir Sakharov, Arnaud de Borchgrave and the present DCI.

We invite our members along with members of the Veterans of OSS so it makes for a very interesting gathering of those who have dedicated themselves to intelligence and the intelligence community.

I hope Mr. Gates's plans will enable him to address our group, for I know our members will be thrilled with an opportunity to visit with him.

I will be looking forward to hearing from you. If you would like any additional information, please feel free to contact me at

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'DLM', is written over the typed name.

Donald L. Milton
President

STAT

DLM:cc